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Transitive inference, class inclusion and a variety of other inferential abilities have strikingly similar developmental profiles—
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theory to show that transitive inference and class inclusion involve dual mathematical structures, called product and
coproduct. Other inferential tasks with similar developmental profiles, including matrix completion, cardinality, dimensional
changed card sorting, balance-scale (weight-distance integration), and Theory of Mind also involve these structures. By
contrast, (co)products are not involved in the behaviours exhibited by younger children on these tasks, or simplified
versions that are within their ability. These results point to a fundamental cognitive principle under development during
childhood that is the capacity to compute (co)products in the categorical sense.
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Introduction
Children acquire various reasoning skills over remarkably
similar periods of development. Transitive Inference and Class
Inclusion are two behaviours among a suite of inferential abilities
that have strikingly similar developmental profiles—all are
acquired around the age of five years [1]. For example, older
children can infer that if John is taller than Mary, and Mary is taller
than Sue, then John is taller than Sue. This form of reasoning is called
Transitive Inference. Older children also understand that a
grocery store will contain more fruit than apples. That is, the
number of items belonging to the superclass is greater than the
number of items in any one of its subclasses. This form of
reasoning is called Class Inclusion. These two types of inference
appear to have little in common. Transitive Inference typically
involves physical relationships between objects, while Class
Inclusion involves abstract relative sizes of object classes.
Nonetheless, explicit tests of these and other inferences for a
range of age groups revealed that success was attained from about
the median age of five years [1].
Since Piaget, decades of research have revealed important clues
regarding the development of inference, yet little is known about
the reasons underlying these correspondences (see [2] for reviews).
A common theme in two recent proposals is the computing of
relational information [3,4]. In regard to Relational Complexity
theory [3], the correspondence between commonly acquired
cognitive behaviours is based on the maximum arity of relations
that must be processed (e.g., tasks acquired after age five involve
ternary relations, i.e., relations between three items). In regard to
Cognitive Complexity and Control theory [4], the correspondence is
based on the common depth of relation hierarchies. Although a
relational approach to cognitive behaviour has a formal basis in
relational algebra [5], certain assumptions must be made about the
units of analysis. For tasks as diverse in procedure and content as
Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion, it is difficult to see how
the analysis of one task leads naturally to the other. For Relational
Complexity theory, Transitive Inference is considered to involve
the integration of two binary relations between task elements into
an ordered triple, or ternary relation; whereas Class Inclusion is
regarded as the integration of three binary relations between three
sets of elements (one complement and two containments) into a
ternary relation [2,3]. For Cognitive Complexity and Control
theory, Transitive Inference involves relations over items; whereas
Class Inclusion involves relations over sets of items.
This theoretical difficulty is symptomatic of the general problem in
cognitive science where the basic components of cognition are
unknown. In the absence of such detailed knowledge, cognitive
modelers have been forced to assume a particular representational
format (e.g., symbolic [6], or subsymbolic [7]). This approach,
however, does not lend itself to the current problem, because the
elementsofTransitiveInferenceandClassInclusiontasks(i.e.,objects
and classes of objects) do not share a common basis. Understandably,
then, these sorts of behaviours have tended to be studied in detailed
isolation, narrowing the scope for identifying general principles.
Category theory was born out of a desire to establish formal
commonalities between various mathematical structures [8,9], and
has since been applied to the analysis of computational structures
in computer science (see [10–12]). The seminal insight was a shift
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tions. Contrast, for instance, sets defined in terms of (the properties
of) the objects they contain—Set Theory—against sets defined in
terms of the morphisms that map to or from them—Category
Theory [13]. This insight motivates our categorical approach to
the analysis of inference, and our way around the current impasse.
In cognitive science, several authors have used category theory for
a conceptual analysis of space and time [14–16], though we know
of only one other application that has modeled empirical data
[17]. Since our application of category theory to cognitive
behaviour is novel, we first introduce the basic category theory
constructs needed for our subsequent analysis of Transitive
Inference, Class Inclusion, and other paradigms. The analysis
begins with a brief introduction of the sort of data our approach is
intended to explain, which primarily concerns contrasts between
younger and older children relative to age five, and correlations
across paradigms. Finally, we extend our categorical approach to
more complex levels of inference. Our main point is that, despite
the apparent lack of resemblance, all these tasks are formally
connected via the categorical (co)product, to be defined below.
The significance of this result is that it opens the door to an
entirely new (empirical) approach to identifying general principles,
particularly in regard to the development of inferential abilities,
that are less likely to be revealed by standard modeling methods.
Methods
In this section, we provide the basic category theory definitions
and constructs used in our subsequent analysis of various
inferential abilities. Detailed introductions to category theory are
found in [12,18,19]. Category theory is abstract in the sense that
its entities may not refer to particular concrete objects, such as
system states, or task stimuli, or even other mathematical objects.
This sort of abstractness is a strength of the theory, permitting one
to see the formal connection between otherwise disparate fields.
Nonetheless, this abstractness may also be a source of bewilder-
ment to those unfamiliar with this approach. Hence, throughout
this section, we provide specific examples of category theory
concepts for didactic purposes in some cases, and as a prelude to
our analysis in others.
Category
A category C consists of:
N a class jCj of objects (A,B,...);
N a set C(A,B) of morphisms (also called arrows, or maps), from
A to B, where for each morphism f : A?B indicates that A is
the domain,o rsource and B is the codomain,o rtarget of f (i.e.,
A~dom(f) and B~cod(f));
N a morphism 1A : A?A called the identity for each object A;
and
N a composition operation, denoted ‘‘0’’, of morphisms f : A?B
and g : B?C, written g0f : A?C, satisfying the laws of:
– unity, where f01A~f~1B0f, for all f : A?B; and
– associativity, where h0(g0f)~(h0g)0f, for all f : A?B,
g : B?C and h : C?D.
O n ei m m e d i a t e l yr e c o g n i z a b l ee x a m p l ei st h ec a t e g o r ySet,
w h i c hh a ss e t sf o ro b j e c t sa n df u n c t i o n sf o rm o r p h i s m s ,w h e r e
the identity morphism 1A is the identity function and the
composition operation is the usual function composition
operator ‘‘0’’. Another, less obvious, example is the category
of Euclidean spaces, Euc, which has Rn spaces as objects, where
n is a natural number; m|n matrices for morphisms
f : Rm?Rn, where the identity matrix is the identity morphism;
and matrix multiplication is the composition operation. From a
cognitive perspective, an object may be a cognitive state, set of
states, or some other entity employing symbolic, or numerical
representations, and a morphism may be some cognitive process
transforming one state to another. At present, we do not
prejudge the cognitive nature of objects and morphisms for the
reasons already mentioned.
Categories exist for a diverse range of structures, with objects
more complex than sets of elements, and structure-preserving
morphisms more complex than associations. For example, the
following morphism
(<,z) 
exp ?(<,|) ð1Þ
maps from object (<,z) to object (<,|), where each object
consists of the set of real numbers with additional internal
structure (i.e., a rule—respectively, addition and multiplication—
for combining two numbers into another number). This morphism
maps real numbers x to ex, where ‘‘+’’ in the domain corresponds
to ‘‘|‘‘ in the codomain. Structure is preserved by exp, because
the transformation of the result of applying the rule to the numbers
is the same as the result of applying the corresponding rule to the
transformed numbers. In this case, exzy~ex|ey, for all x,y[<.
This morphism and its (co)domain objects are members of the
category of semigroups, which has semigroups for objects and
semigroup homomorphisms for arrows. A semigroup is just a set S
with an associative binary operation  , and a semigroup
homomorphism, f : (S,   )?(T,#), preserves an object’s internal
structure as illustrated: that is, f(s1   s2)~f(s1)#f(s2). Hence,
 e x p is a semigroup homomorphism. But, not every function is a
morphism in this category. For example, inc (i.e., increment by 1)
(<,z)  
inc ?(<,z) ð2Þ
is not a semigroup homomorphism, because 1z(xzy)=(1zx)z
(1zy). These examples illustrate that although category theory is
abstract, it is not arbitrary. So, statements derived from the theory are,
in principle, testable and falsifiable.
Dual
We need to introduce the notion of the dual C
op of a category C.
C
op is essentially C with all arrows reversed. That is, the set of
Author Summary
Children acquire various reasoning skills during a remark-
ably similar period of development. Yet, the reasons for
these similarities are a mystery. Two examples are
Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion, which develop
around five years of age. Older children understand that if
John is taller than Mary, and Mary is taller than Sue, then
John is also taller than Sue. This form of reasoning is called
transitive inference. Older children also understand that
there are more fruits than apples. This inference is called
class inclusion. We explain why these and a variety of other
abilities show the same development using a branch of
mathematics called category theory. Category theory
reveals that they have related underlying structure. So,
despite their apparent superficial differences these rea-
soning abilities have similar profiles of development
because they involve related sorts of processes.
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op is the same as in C; there is a one-to-one
correspondence between arrows in C and C
op such that the arrow
f : A?B in C corresponds to the arrow f : B?A in C
op; and the
composition f0 g~g0f : C?A is defined in C
op exactly when
g0f : A?C is defined in C. A definition or a proposition and
proof about C gives rise to its dual in C
op by taking the original
definition/proposition/proof and reversing all the arrows. Any
valid argument about the arrows in C is valid for the dual
argument in C
op, so proving or defining something in C gives you
something for free in C
op. Obviously, reversing an arrow twice will
return the original arrow, so C
opop
~C.
Some examples of duals involve certain types of morphisms,
called epimorphisms, monomorphisms and isomorphisms. A
morphism f : A?B is an epimorphism, if for any pair of morphisms
i,j : B?D, i0f~j0f implies i~j. That is, f is an epimorphism if
whenever the following diagram commutes, i~j,
ð3Þ
(Commutative diagrams afford proof by arrow chasing. A diagram is
said to be commutative if the compositions of the morphisms on
any two paths through the diagram, from a common start object to
a common finish object, are equal, except when both paths are of
length 1. In Diagram 3, the start object is A, the finish object is D,
and the two paths are f, i and f, j.) For Set and Euc, a morphism
f is an epimorphism if and only if it is onto (i.e., informally, there
are no elements in the codomain that are unreachable from
elements in the domain via f). A morphism f : A?B is a
monomorphism, if for any pair of morphisms g,h : C?A, f0g~f0h
implies g~h,
ð4Þ
For Set and Euc, a morphism f is a monomorphism if and only if
it is one-to-one. By reversing arrows, we see that the definition of
an epimorphism in a category C is the definition of a
monomorphism in the category C
op (i.e., the definitions are dual).
A morphism f : A?B is an isomorphism if there exists a morphism
g : B?A, such that g0f~1A and f0g~1B. An isomorphism in C
is also an isomorphism in C
op. A more formal treatment of duality
can be found in Text S1.
Products
Cognitive behavior generally involves some means of integrat-
ing information. A general notion of integration is the categorical
product. In any category C,aproduct of two objects A and B is an
object P together with two morphisms p1 : P?A and p2 : P?B,
such that for any pair of morphisms z1 : Z?A and z2 : Z?B,
there is a unique morphism u : Z?P, such that the following
diagram commutes
ð5Þ
where a broken arrow indicates that there exists exactly one
morphism making the diagram commute. The morphisms used in
the definition of a product (p1 and p2 above) are sometimes called
projection morphisms. A product object P is unique up to a unique
isomorphism. That is, for any other product object P’ with
morphisms p’1 : P’?A and p’2 : P’?B there is one and only
one isomorphism between P and P’ that makes a diagram like the
one above commute. This means that P is not unique, only unique
with respect to another product object via isomorphism (a point to
which we will return shortly), which is why the definition refers to a
product, not the product. An essential characteristic of a product
object is that the constituents A and B are retrievable via the
projection morphisms. P is also written A|B, and since u is
uniquely determined by z1 and z2, u is often written as Sz1,z2T,
and the diagram used in defining a product then becomes
ð6Þ
In Set, P is, up to isomorphism, the Cartesian product A|B,
p1 : A|B?A, p2 : A|B?B,w h e r ep1 and p2 are the
projection maps to A and B, i.e., p1 : (a,b).a,a n d
p2 : (a,b).b,a n du is the product function Sz1,z2T : Z?A|B,
sending x to tuple (z1(x),z2(x)),s ot h a tp10u~z1 and p20u~z2.
(The . arrow, often read as ‘‘maps to’’, indicates the action of a
function on a domain element. Thus f(a)~b is equivalent to
f : a.b.) For example, suppose A~fa1,a2g and B~fb1,b2g,
then P~f(a1,b1),(a1,b2),(a2,b1),(a2,b2)g,a n dp1(a1,b1)~a1,
p2(a1,b1)~b1, and so on. Suppose Z~f1g, z1 : 1.a1,a n d
z2 : 1.b1, then the only morphism u making this example
commute is u~Sz1,z2T : 1.(a1,b1).
One can think of tasks involving stimuli that vary along two
task-relevant dimensions as examples involving categorical prod-
ucts. For example, classification tasks where the rule is based on,
say, stimulus colour and size involves a product, with the set of task
stimuli as the product object and the determination of colour and
size features as the projection morphisms. Conservation tasks, for
example, predicting whether the amount of liquid in one container
is the same as another where the containers vary in, say, height
and width also involve products. In this case, the product object is
a set of volumes and the projection maps recover the associated
heights and widths. We will see further examples of tasks involving
products in the next section.
For our purposes, the categorical product (P,p1,p2) is a
statement about a cognitive (sub)system, whereas the triple
(Z,z1,z2) is a constraint on what constitutes a valid product rather
than a specific claim about cognition. Notice that (Z,z1,z2) is not
necessarily a product in its own right, as the example above
illustrated, since the one element set Z~f1g is not isomorphic to
the Cartesian product containing four elements. Notice, further,
that although (P,p1,p2) does pertain to the cognitive system it is
not a commitment to a particular representation and process. To
illustrate, the product object in the previous example could just as
easily be defined as the set P’~fx1,x2,x3,x4g, without explicitly
identifying the components ai and bj, so long as the projections p1
and p2 recover those components appropriately. From the
categorical perspective, these two isomorphic alternatives are the
‘‘same’’, relieving us of any prior commitment to, say, classical
[20] or functional [21] compositionality, which has been a
contentious issue when framing theories of cognition [22].
Coproducts (sums)
A related notion of information integration is the categorical
coproduct. In any category C,acoproduct (or, sum) of two objects A
Categorical (Co)Products and Cognitive Development
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q2 : B?Q, such that for any pair of morphisms z1 : A?Z and
z2 : B?Z, there is a unique morphism u : Q?Z, such that the
following diagram commutes
ð7Þ
The morphisms used in the definition of a coproduct (q1 and q2
above) are sometimes called injection morphisms. A coproduct
object Q is also unique up to a unique isomorphism. Q is also
written AzB, and since u is uniquely determined by z1 and z2, u
is often written as ½z1,z2 , and so the coproduct diagram becomes
ð8Þ
In Set, Q is the disjoint union A ] B, q1 : A?A ] B, and
q2 : B?A ] B. Suppose, for example, A~fa,bg and B~fx,yg,
then Q~f(1,a),(1,b),(2,x),(2,y)g. Basically, every element in A
and B is augmented with a label that identifies the set from which
it came. Unlike set union, which removes duplicates, all
information is maintained.
If we reverse all the arrows in the definition of a coproduct we
get a product. A product in a category C is a coproduct in C
op.
Coproducts are dual to products. The duality between product
and coproduct is shown formally in Text S1.
One way to think about coproducts in terms of cognitive tasks is
to regard the label as the context or condition under which a
stimulus is associated with a particular action. Experimental
paradigms designed to assess cognitive flexibility, such as the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, are examples. For instance, in one
context, say, a reward schedule based on colour, a red triangle
may require one type of response, but for a reward schedule based
on shape, the red triangle requires a different type of response. In
this case, the coproduct object is the disjoint union of the stimulus
set with itself with colour and shape as labels, and the response is
determined by a map from the coproduct object to a set of actions.
Pullbacks and pushouts
More generally, information integration is often subject to
satisfying some constraint. Hence, product and coproduct are
instances of more general constructs known as pullbacks and
pushouts, respectively. A pullback of morphisms f : A?C and
g : B?C is an object P and a pair of morphisms p1 : P?A and
p2 : P?B satisfying f0p1~g0p2, such that for any pair of
morphisms z1 : Z?A and z2 : Z?B such that f0z1~g0z2, there
is a unique morphism u : Z?P, such that the following diagram
commutes:
ð9Þ
In such a pullback, P may also be denoted by A|CB. The
constraint is contained in the requirement that the square in
Diagram 9 should commute.
Intersection is an example of pullback in Set, where P~A\B,
C~A|B, and p1, p2, f and g are inclusions. More generally, a
pullback is a constrained product, restricted to satisfy the
constraints imposed by f and g, so that f0p1~g0p2, with P as
the set of solutions.
Pushout is dual to pullback. A pushout of morphisms f : C?A
and g : C?B is an object Q and a pair of morphisms q1 : A?Q
and q2 : B?Q satisfying q10f~q20g, such that for any pair of
morphisms z1 : A?Z and z2 : B?Z such that z10f~z20g, there
is a unique morphism u : Q?Z, such that the following diagram
commutes:
ð10Þ
In such a pushout, Q may also be denoted by AzCB.
Given the duality, union is an example of pushout in Set,
where Q~A|B, C~A\B, and all morphisms are inclusions.
In this case, the pushout is also a pullback. A more general
pushout in Set involves a form of disjoint union such that
elements ai~f(ck) and bj~g(ck) are identified (i.e., ‘‘glued’’
together) in the pushout object [9,23]. For example, suppose
C~fcg, f : c.a1 and g : c.b2,a n dA~f(a1,a2)g and
B~f(b2,b3)g,t h e nA]CB~f(1,a1),(1,a2),(2,b3)g or, equivalent-
ly, f(1,a1),(2,b2),(2,b3)g. Here (1,a2)~(2,b2), because they have
been identified as described above. (These elements are actually
equivalence classes whose members are identified by coequalizers
[24], but we use this form for convenience.) In general, Q is the
integration of components providing no more and no less
information than necessary to satisfy the requirement that
q10f~q20g.
For our purposes, the commutative squares in the pullback and
pushout diagrams pertain to statements about cognitive (sub)sys-
tems, and (Z,z1,z2) constrains what constitutes a valid pullback/
pushout construction. Aside from definitions, then, we no longer
refer to Z and associated morphisms z1, z2, and u, so they are
omitted from subsequent diagrams.
Initial and terminal objects and their (co)products
An initial object in a category C is an object 0, such that for
every object A there is exactly one morphism f : 0?A in C.A
terminal object is an object 1, such that for every object A there
exists a unique morphism g : A?1 in C.I nSet, the only initial
object is the empty set 1, and any one-element set, e.g., fag,i sa
terminal object. (In Set, the initial object, 0, has 0 members,
while the terminal object, 1, has 1 member. In some other
categories, e.g. Euc, the initial object is also the terminal object,
and is then called a null object. Some categories, such as a
discrete category with no non-identity arrows, lack an initial
object, or a terminal object, or both.) Multiple initial objects in a
category are not distinguished because they are isomorphic, and
the same also applies to terminal objects [18,24]. In a category
with initial and terminal objects, products and coproducts, a
product of an object A with a terminal object is isomorphic to A,
A|1%A; and a coproduct of A with an initial object is
Categorical (Co)Products and Cognitive Development
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product fa,b,cg|f1g~f(a,1),(b,1),(c,1)g%fa,b,cg;a n dt h e
disjoint union fa,b,cg]1~f(1,a),(1,b),(1,c)g%fa,b,cg.T h e
following diagram
ð11Þ
involving a terminal object (1) is always a pullback, and when
B~1, p1 is an isomorphism. The following diagram
ð12Þ
involving an initial object (0) is always a pushout, and when
B~0, q1 is an isomorphism. For subsequent pullback/pushout
diagrams, we omit references to specific morphisms with an
initial object as its domain, or a terminal object as its codomain,
since their existence is guaranteed by definition. Usually, the
initial or terminal object is also omitted in these cases, but we
choose to show it for conformity with the other diagrams.
These ‘‘special’’ cases are important for determining whether a
system that apparently involves a (co)product is in fact isomorphic
to one that does not. We will see an example of this situation in the
next section. In these situations, we say that task difficulty is related
to the simpler, non-(co)product form.
Notice that we could have explained all this just in terms of the
particular product, coproduct, pullback, pushout, initial and
terminal object that prevail in Set. Presenting in the more general
case of products, etc., in an arbitrary category, makes it clearer
that these are not constructions specific to Set, but instances of a
wider phenomenon.
Results
In this section, we apply category theory concepts to the analysis
of results from several studies that have provided empirical
evidence of within group similarities and between group
differences in behavioural performance across multiple tasks.
The objective is to identify a formal basis for an equivalence class
of tasks that accounts for these similarities and differences. Our
seed paradigms are Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion,
which were tested on age groups ranging from three to eight years
[1]. The main finding was that significant above chance
performances on Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion were
observed around five years. By contrast, younger children (three-
and four-year-olds) showed significant above chance performance
only on simpler versions of these two tasks. The thrust of our
analysis is to show that these tasks are formally connected by the
dual relationship between product (Transitive Inference) and
coproduct (Class Inclusion). By contrast, the simpler versions of
these tasks do not involve a (co)product, or involve a (co)product in
the trivial sense (e.g., A|1%A). Then, in the remainder of this
section, we extend this analysis to other paradigms, including:
Matrix Completion, Cardinality, Card Sorting, Balance-scale, and
Theory of Mind. In each case, the more difficult version of the
task, where significant above chance performance was observed in
the five-year-olds and older children, involves a product or
coproduct. By contrast, performance in the younger age groups
does not, or involves a (co)product with an initial or terminal
object, which reduces via isomorphism to a single map. Thus, the
core characteristic that distinguishes performance by younger
(three-, or four-year-olds) versus older (five-year-olds and above)
children is computing the categorical (co)product and its
encompassing pullback (pushout).
The data of primary concern here are the correlations in
achievement across paradigms and the significant differences
between age groups within paradigms. Age five is regarded as a
‘‘nominal’’ timepoint in that some children exhibit success at a
younger or older age. For example, 11% of the three- and four-
year-olds, and 71% of six-year-olds succeeded on Transitive
Inference, and respectively 15% and 67% succeeded on Class
Inclusion [1] (Table 16). Correlations are directly testable using
within-participant across-paradigm studies. For this reason, our
primary data sources come from three studies showing significant
correlations between Transitive Inference, Class Inclusion, and
Cardinality [1]; Transitive Inference, Class Inclusion, Cardinality
and Theory of Mind [25]; and Transitive Inference, Class
Inclusion, and Balance-scale[26]. For example, the correlations
in performance between Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion
(0.54), Transitive Inference and Cardinality (0.54), and Class
Inclusion and Cardinality (0.47) were all significant (pv:01) [1]
(Table 6). However, to illustrate the diverse applicability of our
category theory approach, we also include two other contrast
studies revealing significant differences between the same age
groups (i.e., younger versus older than age five) albeit with
different individuals for Matrix Completion (see [2]), and
Dimensional Change Card Sorting [27].
Transitive Inference
A transitive inference has the general form that given aRb and
bRc, then one can infer aRc, where R is some binary relation that
has the transitivity property. A Transitive Inference task, as
typically administered to children, involves presenting participants
with a series of premise pairs followed by a series of test pairs to
assess inferential capability. The premise series usually consists of
four pairs, AB, BC, CD, and DE, and testing is done on non-
adjacent pair, BD (not in the premise series). AC and DE are not
considered as evidence of transitive inference, because a consistent
response is obtainable by noting that A or E was paired with only
one other stimulus.
Transitivity is a property of relations, so a transitive inference is
just a particular operation in relational algebra. In relational
algebra, an equijoin of two relations is the set of tuples that have the
same values on the specified attributes. For example, suppose
R~f(A,B),(B,C)g and S~f(C,D),(D,E)g, then the equijoin
along the second and first attributes of R and S (respectively) is
f(B,C,D)g. (Only tuples with the same values at the specified
attributes are joined, and the redundant attribute removed. For
further details of relational operators, see for example [28].) A
transitive inference, then, involves a product of premise relations,
indicated in the following example diagram
ð13Þ
where pi is the project operator in relational algebra, returning the
values of each relation instance at the attributes listed by i. The
transitive inference bRd involves the constraint that premises
involving b and d share a common element c in the second and
first positions, respectively (i.e., bRc and cRd). This constraint is
captured by the following diagram (which relates to a pullback)
Categorical (Co)Products and Cognitive Development
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where the joins of other premise pairs (e.g., AB and BC based on
the common element B) are omitted for clarity.
To contrast younger versus older children’s performance,
children were presented with difficult and simple versions of this
paradigm [1]. In the difficult version of the task, children were
presented with two non-adjacent blocks BD and asked which block
would be higher in a tower constructed from the premise pairs
(mini-towers). From Diagram 14 we see that this inference involves
a map from the product object. That is, given b as one block, then
the other block will be higher if it corresponds to d. In the simpler
version of the task, children were given one of the mini-towers and
a sequence of adjacent blocks and asked to build the complete
tower (e.g., BC, followed by D, A, E). Each step only requires a
map from one of the premise objects to determine where the next
block should be placed. Thus, it does not require computing the
product. Significantly, while younger and older children were
successful on the simpler version of the task, the older children but
not the younger ones were generally successful on the difficult
version [1].
Class Inclusion
In a Class Inclusion task, participants are given examples of a
superclass, and two complementary subclasses and asked about
their relative sizes. For example, given the superclass, fruit, and
subclasses apples and non-apples, participants are asked, Are there more
apples than fruit? We show that class inclusion involves a coproduct.
Coproduct is the dual of product, hence there is a duality between
Class Inclusion and Transitive Inference.
Class inclusion is a property of sets, so a class inclusion inference
involves a particular set operation—disjoint union. As we have
seen, the disjoint union of two objects in the category of sets is the
coproduct. Suppose, for example, the set of apple referents, or
indices fi1,...,iag and non-apple indices fj1,...,jng. The
coproduct is
ð15Þ
where qA and qN are the apple and non-apple injection maps,
respectively. The inference is obtained by observing the cardinality
of each set. Typically, a Class Inclusion task involves complemen-
tary subsets, so their intersection is empty. This arrangement is
captured in the following pushout diagram
ð16Þ
In a variation of Class Inclusion where A\B~C, elements
common to subclasses A and B would be identified by A]CB,s o
they would not be counted twice in the superclass, i.e.,
jA]CBj~jA|Bj.
The same groups of children who were tested on Transitive
Inference were also tested on Class Inclusion [1]. Three questions
were posed to children who performed a version of Class Inclusion
consisting of blue triangles and circles, so that the two subclasses
were triangles and circles and the superclass was blue shapes. They
were: (1) Are there more triangles than circles? (2) Are there more blue things
or more triangles? (3) Are there more circles or more blue things? The older
children were successful on all three questions, whereas the
younger children were generally successful on the first question
only [1]. Questions 2 and 3 involve maps from one of the
component objects and the coproduct object to their cardinalities.
By contrast, Question 1 involves maps from the component objects
only, so the coproduct object is not involved.
There is a subtle difference between the diagrams for Transitive
Inference and Class Inclusion. Transitive Inference involves a
constrained product, while Class Inclusion involves an unconstrained
coproduct. The bottom-right object in Diagram 14 is not a
terminal object (other constraining elements were omitted),
whereas the top-left object in Diagram 16 is the initial object.
This difference has implications for pullback/pushout diagrams
containing (co)products of more than two objects, which we
address in the next section when we consider a more complex
version of Class Inclusion. The other paradigms considered in the
remainder of this section involve only unconstrained (co)products.
Other paradigms
Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion are both difficult for
children below about the age of five years. Our analysis indicates
that underlying this common difficulty is a lack of capacity to
compute categorical (co)products. In the remainder of this section,
we analyze other tasks used to compare performance within and
contrast performance between groups of younger and older
children.
Matrix Completion. In a modified version of Matrix
Completion [2], children are presented with a grid of figures
that vary along rows and columns in either one or two feature
dimensions (e.g., colour and shape). The task is to infer a missing
figure that matches features with the other figures in the
corresponding row and column. For example, if the first, second
and third rows contain circles, triangles and squares; and the first,
second and third columns contain red, green and blue figures
(respectively), then the missing figure in the second row and
column is a green triangle. This inference is obtained from a
product of the object containing the shapes and the object
containing colours. The pullback is indicated by the following
diagram
ð17Þ
where S|C is the Cartesian product of the set of shapes S and
colours C; ps and pc are the shape and colour projections; and 1
is terminal (i.e., there are no constraints on the product). The
grid identifying shape locations is also construed as a product,
S/
pX X|Y ?
pY C, where X and Y are the row and column
positions in the grid and pX and pY are the respective index to
shape and colour maps. We regard this product as input to the
cognitive system—thus X|Y takes the roll of Z in the definition
of product. The defining property of a product guarantees the
existence of Sz1,z2T : X|Y?S|C, and X|Y%S|C (see
Products), so the correct coloured shape can be inferred from the
missing figure location. Older children have demonstrated
successful performance on this task. However, younger children
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task where one of the feature dimensions was constant (e.g., all red
shapes, or all triangles, see [2]). In the simpler forms of this task,
one of the component objects contains only one element. For
example, if all shapes were coloured red, then the colour object is
the set fredg. As indicated in the previous section, a single element
set is a terminal object in the category Set. The product object as
indicated in the following diagram
ð18Þ
is isomorphic to the shape object, S, and therefore not required for
the inference. The correct figure is inferred by a direct map to the
shape object (i.e., pX). Since all terminal objects are isomorphic,
the same result is obtained regardless of the particular feature held
constant, as we would expect.
Cardinality. Participants are presented with rows of items
(e.g., four ducks, five frogs, or seven balls), and are asked three
types of questions: (1) How many x are there? where x identifies the
type of item (e.g., ducks); (2) Can you show me y by drawing a circle
around y? where y is the number of items counted; and (3) If you
counted from the other end, how many would there be? The third question
directly tests the understanding that counting does not depend on
order. Thus, a counting strategy that simply increments a counter
in a particular order would fail when the order was reversed. A
counting strategy that does not rely on item order must keep track
of two types of items: those that have been counted; and those that
have not. These two types are complementary subsets of the total
set of items to be counted. Hence, Cardinality involves the same
pushout structure as Class Inclusion, as indicated by the following
diagram
ð19Þ
where C and U refer to the counted and uncounted subsets,
respectively. In general, four-year-olds were successful on the first
two questions, but only the older groups (five years and above)
were successful on the third [1]. Questions 1 and 2 do not require
anything more than in-order counting of a set of elements already
identified by a single type or location. Hence, counting in these
two situations does not involve constructing a coproduct of
subtypes. Although this task arguably has an added component
where elements are transferred from the uncounted to the counted
set, it is not part of the coproduct process.
Dimensional change card sorting. In this task, participants
are presented cards identifiable by coloured shapes on the visible
side. Two target cards are placed on a table. Children play two
sorting games by placing additional (sort) cards under one of the
target cards based on the same colour (colour game), or same
shape (shape game). Suppose, for example, the target cards were
labeled red triangle (.) and green circle (p). In the context of playing
the colour game, a child should place a red circle () card under the
red triangle target card, and a green triangle (+) card under the green
circle target card. In the context of the shape game, a red circle card
should be placed under the green circle target, and a green triangle card
under the red triangle target. In general, only the five- and six-year-
olds performed this task above chance level, but not the three- and
four-year-olds [27]. By contrast, three- and four-year-olds were
only successful on a simpler form of the task where one of the two
feature dimensions was constant. For example, in the shape game,
the additional cards were either red triangle or red circle cards.
The more difficult version involves a product between dimension
(colour, shape) and the two sort cards (,+) as indicated by the
following diagram
ð20Þ
where d and f are the dimension and figure projections
(respectively). The inference is obtained by a map from the
product object to the object containing the two target cards (not
shown). In the simpler version of this task, the sort cards differ on
only one dimension, so the games involve different sets of sort
cards. For the colour game, the sort cards are  and p; and for
the shape game,  and .. In this case, the dimension and sort
card objects do not form a correct product—because the sort card
object now has three elements, the product contains pairs (C,.)
and (S,p) that were not part of the task. Rather, in each game,
the target is inferred from just one feature dimension, either colour
or shape but not both. Hence, the simpler version does not involve
a product.
Balance-scale: weight-distance integration. In a modified
form of the balance-scale task, called weight-distance integration,
participants were shown a one-arm balance and asked to predict
the degree of tilt given a weight placed at a distance from the pivot
[26]. The arm was horizontal when no weight was added, and
pointed to one of nine pictured animals when tilted. Thus, a tilt
angle prediction was indicated by the expected animal pointed to
after releasing the arm. A spring provided the appropriate balance
mechanism. There were three levels of weight and three levels of
distance. Five-, six- and seven-year-olds predicted tilt by
integrating both distance and weight information, either
additively or multiplicatively. Four-year-olds predicted tilt
without integration (i.e., by weight, or distance only). Three-
year-olds used neither strategy and were generally non-systematic
in their responses [26]. Since product and coproduct are
generalizations of multiplication and addition, then the
integrative strategies are naturally captured by pullbacks and
pushouts, respectively. The pullback is indicated by the diagram
ð21Þ
where W|D is the Cartesian product of the set of weights W and
distances D; pw and pd are the weight and distance projections;
and 1 is terminal (i.e., there are no constraints on the product). Tilt
prediction is a map t| : W|D?A from the product object to the
set of animals indicating the degree of tilt (not shown). The
additive strategy is captured by the following pushout diagram
ð22Þ
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qw and qd are the corresponding injections. Tilt prediction is a
map tz : WzD?A (not shown). The simpler strategy used by
the four-year-olds just involves a map from either the weight or
distance object to the predicted tilt position.
Theory of mind. For this paradigm two sorts of tasks were
employed: appearance-reality; and false-belief [25]. As an example
of an appearance-reality task, children are shown milk poured into
a glass wrapped in a red filter. The colour of the milk is visible
before and after being poured into the glass. After filling the glass
they are asked an appearance question, When you look at this milk
right now, does it look red or does it look white?; and a reality question
What color is the milk really and truly? Is it white or is it red? As an
example of a false-belief task, children are shown drawings of a
boy and a puppy and told the story, Sam wants to find his puppy. Sam’s
puppy is really in the kitchen. Sam thinks his puppy is in the bathroom. They
are then asked a belief question, Where will Sam look first for his puppy,
the bathroom or the kitchen?; and a reality question, Where is the puppy
really, the bathroom or the kitchen? Four variations of appearance-
reality and four variations of false-belief tasks were tested on three
age groups: three-, four- and five-year-olds (16 participants in each
group). Only one of the three-year-olds, seven of the four-year-olds
and twelve of the five-year-olds passed the combined tasks, where
pooled responses over the eight tasks were significantly above
chance [25]. Both appearance-reality and false-belief involve a
pushout. The following diagram indicates the pushout for the milk
task example
ð23Þ
where qa and qr are the injection maps, identifying colour in the
context of appearance and reality (respectively). The puppy task
example is similarly indicated by the following pushout diagram
ð24Þ
where qb and qr are the injection maps, identifying location in the
context of belief and reality (respectively). In both cases, the
inference is obtained by a map from the coproduct object to colour
or location. By contrast, without the coproduct object one cannot
determine the correct context for colour or location. Hence, the
expected number of correct responses is the same as chance,
corresponding to the performance of the younger children.
Summary
The distinguishing characteristic at the heart of the behavioural
difference between younger (less than five years old) versus older
(more than five years old) children is the categorical (co)product. In
the case of Transitive Inference, Matrix Completion, and Card
Sorting, this difference was realised by task design (e.g., one versus
two relevant feature dimensions). In the case of Class Inclusion
and Cardinality, this difference was realized by questions probing,
for example, one versus two feature dimensions. And, in the case
of Balance-scale and Theory of Mind, this difference was realized
by alternative task strategies as inferred from the types of response
errors. In each paradigm, the more difficult situation observed in
the older children required access to a (co)product. By contrast, the
less difficult situation observed in younger and older children
involved directly accessing the component objects without
computing or accessing a (co)product. These correspondences
have been confirmed directly with the same participants
performing multiple paradigms that included: Transitive Infer-
ence, Class Inclusion, and Cardinality [1]; Transitive Inference,
Class Inclusion, Cardinality and Theory of Mind [25]; and
Transitive Inference, Class Inclusion, and Balance-scale [26].
Beyond early development: Finite (co)products
So far, our analysis has been confined to early development
around the age of five, where the capacity to compute (co)products
was identified as crucial. The more interesting statistic for our
purposes is the correlation across paradigms, rather than a specific
age of attainment. That is, for example, whether or not a four(six)-
year-old who succeeds (fails) at Transitive Inference also succeeds
(fails) at Class Inclusion. However, the simpler versions of these
tasks often form baselines that are within the capacity of all
children. In these situations, floor effects may attenuate the ability
to detect significant correlations. A methodological solution is to
contrast tasks at ‘‘higher levels’’ of complexity at which neither
level constituents a baseline (i.e., within the capacity of all
participants). Hence, in this section, we extend our analysis to
more complex tasks.
A number of studies point to higher complexity levels, at least in
adult cognition. For example, adults were tested on their ability to
identify the number of interactions underlying fictitious data sets
reported as bar graphs [29]. A two-way interaction, for instance,
was identifiable by observing that the change in bar height
between conditions a1 and a2 under condition b1 differed under
condition b2. The maximum number of interactions that adults
could effectively recognize was about four [29]. Adults have also
been tested on Raven’s Progressive Matrices, which is closely
related to Matrix Completion, where the number of feature
dimensions was increased to three. Functional magnetic resonance
imaging revealed significant differences in activity for regions in
the prefrontal cortex when figures varied along three versus two
feature dimensions [30]. These sorts of tasks have been
characterized in terms of the arity of relations processed (e.g.,
binary, ternary, quaternary) [3], or the number of related task
‘‘variables’’ [31]. Our main purpose in this section is to show how
our category theory approach incorporates higher levels of
complexity. Unlike the studies examined in the previous section,
there have not been multi-paradigm within-participant compar-
ison/between-participant contrast studies for these more complex
tasks. So, we proceed by extending the analysis to more complex
versions of the seven paradigms considered above.
In category theory, the (co)product extends naturally to any
finite number of objects. Moreover, the degenerate case where the
number of objects is one corresponds to the no (co)product cases in
the previous section. First, we provide the basic definitions before
showing how the existing paradigms are extendable to more
complex cases.
Finite (co)products. In any category C,afinite product of n
objects A1,...,An is an object P together with n morphisms
pi : P?Ai, such that for any n-tuple of morphisms zi : Z?Ai,
there is a unique morphism u : Z?P, such that the following
diagram commutes
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where P is denoted by A1|...|An, and u by Sz1,...,znT.
The finite coproduct is defined similarly. In any category C,a
finite coproduct of n objects A1,...,An is an object Q together with n
morphisms qi : Ai?Q, such that for any n-tuple of morphisms
zi : Ai?Z, there is a unique morphism u : Q?Z, such that the
following diagram commutes
ð26Þ
where Q is denoted by A1z...zAn, and u by ½z1,...,zn .
Naturally, finite product and finite coproduct are dual. That is, a
coproduct of n objects in C is a product of n objects in C
op.
There are four ways of constructing a product of three objects,
and the product objects, though not equal, are isomorphic, i.e.,
A|B|C%(A|B)|C%A|(B|C)%(A|B)|B(B|C). The
construction A|(B|C) is indicated in the following diagram
ð27Þ
The diagram for the construction (A|B)|C is similar except
that the product objects are arranged vertically. However, the
construction of (A|B)|B(B|C) also involves a pullback, as
indicated in the following diagram
ð28Þ
where the ternary product object is denoted A|B|C, since the
four ternary product objects are isomorphic.
There are also four ways of constructing a coproduct of three
objects, and the coproduct objects are also isomorphic, i.e.,
AzBzC%(AzB)zC%Az(BzC)%(AzB)zB(BzC).
These constructions are dual to the respective products. The
construction of (AzB)zC is indicated by the diagram
ð29Þ
and (AzB)zB(BzC), which contains a pushout, is indicated by
the diagram
ð30Þ
where the ternary coproduct is denoted AzBzC.
Extensions to paradigms. All seven paradigms analyzed in
the previous section can be extended in terms of (co)products of
more than two objects. Only ternary (co)products are considered
here, but extensions to more objects are also possible. We focus on
Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion, and sketch extensions to
the other paradigms. Transitive Inference can be extended to
include an additional premise EF, and an additional nonadjacent
test pair BE that requires two equijoins, for example, BC and CD
to infer BD, and BD and DE to infer BE. In category theory terms,
this inference involves three pullbacks, indicated by the diagram
ð31Þ
omitting some composition morphisms for clarity. By the pullback
lemma [24], if two adjacent commutative squares are pullbacks,
then the composed commutative rectangle is a pullback. This diagram
contains two commutative rectangles, indicated in part by the
composition arrows p½3,4  and p½1,2 .
Class Inclusion can be extended dually by supposing an
additional subclass (e.g., squares). For example, participants are
presented with small blue triangles (T), small red circles (C) and
large red squares (S). They are asked: (1) Are there more triangles and
circles than red shapes? (2) Are there more triangles and circles than shapes? (3)
Are there more circles and squares than shapes? Question 1 involves binary
coproducts, whereas Questions 2 and 3 involve ternary coproducts.
For comparison with Question 1 of the original Class Inclusion task,
the question Are there more triangles or circles? involves neither binary
nor ternary coproduct, or what might be called a unary coproduct.
The ternary coproduct is indicated in the diagram
ð32Þ
Notice that although this diagram involves a ternary coproduct,
which is dual to a ternary product, the diagram itself is not dual to
Diagram 31 for extended Transitive Inference. The reason is that
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the same (and so too are the two morphisms with C as their
codomain). Since the diagrams do not have the same number of
objects (i.e., eight versus seven), they cannot be isomorphic. This
difference, which we touched on earlier, arises because the
coproduct is unconstrained.
An alternative version of extended Class Inclusion that uses
constrained coproducts involves subclasses containing common
elements. For example, suppose that instead we have a collection
of small and large rectangular bars of various colours and
orientations. Within this collection, three subclasses are relevant:
small (S), red (R) and vertical (V) bars, which include small red
(SR) and red vertical (RV) bars. The following corresponding
questions are asked: (1) Are there more small bars and red bars than red
bars and vertical bars? (2) Are there more small bars and red bars than bars?
(3) Are there more red bars and vertical bars than bars? The constrained
coproducts are indicated in the following diagram.
ð33Þ
where SR and RV are not the same object. Hence, this diagram is
dual to the extended Transitive Inference diagram.
Matrix Completion, Dimensional Change Card Sorting, and
Balance-scale involve similar extensions to ternary products, though
the latter two are redesigned to accommodate all three levels of
products (i.e., unary, binary, and ternary) within the one paradigm.
For Matrix Completion, the figures vary along a third feature
dimension, such as size. In this case, the task involves a ternary
product of colour, shape and size, i.e., C|Sh|Sz. Dimensional
Change Card Sorting can be modified to include a third switch rule
indicating whether the cards are to be sorted using the same (no
switch) or opposite (switch) colour or shape feature. In this case, the
task involves a ternary product of rule, dimension and shape, i.e.,
R|D|S. The Balance-scale task can be modified so that tilt angle
also depends on spring strength. This case involves a product of the
spring (S), weight and distance, i.e., S|W|D.
Theory of Mind and Cardinality involve more substantial
changes, so we address these two tasks separately. Theory of Mind
canbeextended by including an additionaltransformationcondition
thatinvolvesmixing poweredchocolate,whichchanges thecolour of
milk to brown. In this case, there are two binary coproducts for
separately combining the reality and filtered glass contexts, and
reality and mixing contexts, and one ternary coproduct for
combining all three contexts, as indicated by the following diagram
ð34Þ
where R is the reality context, F is the filter context, and M is the
mixing context, and prefixing for the ternary coproduct elements is
omitted for clarity. This diagram, like Diagram 32, involves
unconstrained coproducts. It is isomorphic to the unconstrained
version of extended Class Inclusion (Diagram 32), but not the
constrained version (Diagram 33), or extended Transitive Inference
(Diagram 31). Unlike Class Inclusion, though, there does not appear
to be a constrained coproduct version of Theory of Mind in this
form, since there is only one object of interest (e.g., milk) in the task.
Cardinality in its current form, though, does not appear to have
an extension to ternary coproducts. A possible alternative form,
similar to extended Class Inclusion, requires participants to count
various combinations subclasses/superclasses (e.g., triangles, circle
and squares). The diagram for this case involves a ternary
coproduct like the one for unconstrained or constrained Class
Inclusion (see Diagram 32 and 33), where the objects are sets of
indices and the coproduct is disjoint union (see Diagram 16).
Segmenting and chunking. For some tasks, there may exist
alternative task strategies for achieving the same goals without
exceeding capacity limits. In the context of Relational Complexity
Theory, two general strategies were identified as segmenting and
chunking [3]. Segmenting refers to serializing a process by computing
intermediate results. In fact, an example of segmenting appeared in
theprevioussectionasthesimplified version ofTransitive Inference,
where complete premise towers were constructed from a sequence
of mini-towers, circumventing the binary product. The key to this
strategy was supplied by the experimenter in the form of adjacent
blocks. Chunking refers to recoding information to temporarily
reduce (relational) details. Labeling is a common strategy. For
example, the relationships between two hydrogen and one oxygen
atom are chunked as water. A key to this strategy is learning. Here,
we show the category theory equivalent for the extended versions of
Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion.
From the definitions, we saw four ways of constructing ternary
(co)product objects. Although these objects are isomorphic,
Diagram 27 and 28 for constructing A|(B|C) and
(A|B)|B(B|C) are not, since the first refers to five objects,
but the second refers to six. This difference suggests an alternative
diagram for computing Transitive Inference BE from premises
BC, CD, and DE. Indeed, in the following diagram
ð35Þ
the inference BE is derived by mapping out elements b and e from
the product object f(b,c,e)g in the right pullback with the
morphism p’½1,3  (not shown). Notice that the two pullbacks in this
diagram involve only binary products. The crucial step involves
the projection morphism p½1,3 , which removes the middle term d,
as it is no longer needed to obtain the inference via a second
pullback. The key to this strategy is being able to segment the
inference into a sequence of two steps.
A related situation also arises for Class Inclusion, which is
shown in the following diagram
ð36Þ
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recoding (chunking) of triangles and circles into instances of a
common object type, TC. For example, a possible key to accessing
this type of strategy is to recode on the basis of a common feature
by asking the question Are there more small shapes than shapes? These
two examples illustrate in category theory terms how the
complexity of a task may be influenced by strategy.
Discussion
Using category theory constructs, we have revealed a formal
connection between Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion.
Transitive Inference involves a categorical product of premise
relations. Class Inclusion involves a coproduct between two
complementary subclasses. In category theory, product and
coproduct are dual. Thus, the formal connection between
Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion is that they involve the
‘‘same’’ (isomorphic) processes in the categorical sense. This
connection extends to other tasks establishing an equivalence class
of inferential abilities formally based on the need to compute
(co)products. In the simpler, one-dimensional version of Matrix
Completion, the apparent product is isomorphic to a structure that
does not involve a (co)product. Note that children are not required
to first compute the (co)product to realize that it’s reducible: they
use a (co)product-free strategy which works, because of the simpler
nature of the task. These results point to a fundamental principle
under development during childhood that is the capacity to
compute (co)products.
The implication that computing (co)products is fundamental to
cognitive development raises two general questions: (1) Is the
connection between these inferential abilities real, or just a
coincidence? (2) If the connection is real, what does computing a
(co)product mean in terms of possible neurocognitive processes?
To the first question, as with any theory, one cannot rule out the
possibility of being discounted by new data. The best one can hope
for is to account for a wide variety of cases that are within the
intended scope of the theory. In this regard, the empirical evidence
now available and the variety of cases analyzed, both positive and
negative conditions in each of seven paradigms, gives us cause for
confidence that the connection is indeed real.
There are several caveats, however, in regard to establishing
correspondences between paradigms and age groups. First, as
already mentioned, an important consideration is the correlation
across paradigms, not a specific age of achievement. Second, task
knowledge and familiarity with materials will obviously be
modulating factors. Third, in some cases, there may exist
alternative task strategies that circumvent a particular level of
complexity, as shown in the extended versions of Transitive
Inference and Class Inclusion. These sorts of considerations have
been discussed elsewhere in the context of Relational Complexity
theory [32]. Hence, while we argue that categorical (co)product
captures an important aspect of cognitive development, it is not
intended to be the only consideration, nor is it necessarily
incompatible with other approaches.
Category theory offers a potentially powerful approach to
theorizing about cognition by not having to presuppose an, as yet,
unknown internal structure for cognitive states representing task
elements. Notice that the definition of a functor, and therefore
duality (see Text S1) does not make reference to the elements
within an object (i.e., an object’s internal structure). The definitions
refer only to the morphisms, which constrain the relationships
between objects (i.e., their external structure). So, one is not
required to make an a priori commitment to, say, symbolic or
subsymbolic computational processes. In this sense, category
theory complements more detailed (e.g., symbolic, or connec-
tionist) approaches to cognitive modeling. In particular, we started
with the difficulty that Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion
poses for Relational Complexity and Complexity and Cognitive Control
theories. From our categorical perspective, we now see that the
Relational Complexity explanation of Transitive Inference (i.e.,
integration of two binary relations into a ternary relation) is a
special case of a categorical product. The commutative diagrams
for ternary (co)products also show how one may incorporate a
levels of hierarchy explanation, as may be employed by
Complexity and Cognitive Control theory, where a ternary
(co)product may be computed from two binary (co)products.
While the abstractness afforded by category theory is generally
seen as a strength, it leaves open the question of what exactly is
being computed in these situations. To the second question, then,
we look to neuroscience. One of the major attractions of category
theory for mathematicians and computer scientists is that it offers
abstraction (hence, generalization) with precision. Cognitive
neuroscience research has implicated the prefrontal cortex as
important for processing relational information [30,33–35]. For
example, patients with damage to prefrontal cortex were
significantly worse on Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion
tasks than normals and patients with anterior temporal cortical
damage [35]. Adults, but not children (8–12 years old) showed
sustained activity in rostrolateral prefrontal cortex during the more
difficult two-relation than one-relation condition of a Raven’s
Progressive Matrices task [33]. The general suggestion has been
that regions within the prefrontal cortex are responsible, in some
informal sense, for the integration and maintenance of relational
information [30]. Our category theory approach makes more
precise claims in formal terms of pullbacks and pushouts.
Research on the neural basis of reasoning has focussed on
localizing functionality to specific cortical regions, particularly
within the prefrontal cortex. Yet, the commutative diagrams
clearly show the importance of transformations between objects.
One intriguing possibility is that the morphisms correspond to
functional connectivity realized in part by long-distance cortical
connections. An area where the neural basis of cognitive function
has been studied in detail is visual attention (see [36]). Conjunctive
visual search involves finding a target item among a display of
non-targets, where the target is uniquely identified by a
conjunction of features, such as colour and orientation. In
categorical terms, conjunctive search involves a product of (e.g.,
colour and orientation) feature maps. Each feature map is a set of
location-feature relationships, and their conjunction is the product
of those maps constrained by location (i.e., a pullback). It is well-
known that conjunctive search is more difficult (steeper search
slope) than feature search (see [37]). Interestingly, a visual search
study on monkeys using implanted electrodes revealed greater
frontal-parietal neural synchrony in the lower gamma band (22–34
Hz) for conjunctive than feature search [38]. A corresponding
significant increase in phase synchrony between frontal and
parietal scalp electrodes in the same frequency band was also
reported in humans [39]. Whether the product underlying
conjunctive search relates to the products identified here remains
to be determined. What this example illustrates is a further benefit
of a categorical approach, where the methods of one field are
shown to have novel applications in another—in this example,
phase synchrony as an indicator of complexity.
A recurring theme in our analysis of these tasks is the integration
(either multiplicatively, or additively) of multiple sources of
information. Regions within the prefrontal cortex are often
assigned this role, both anatomically and functionally (see [40]
for a review). A general theory of intelligence proposes that
Categorical (Co)Products and Cognitive Development
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cortical regions is a key factor [41]. Hence, maturation of cortical
connectivity is a possible biological basis for the observed
correspondences in the development of inference, though we do
not regard maturation as the only factor, as already discussed.
More generally, we have used category theory to propose new
experiments that directly test comparisons and contrasts for all
levels. The basis for determining whether tasks belong to the same
level is isomorphism, either between objects or the diagrams
(categories) to which they belong. In regard to the latter, we
identified a subtle difference between diagrams containing
constrained versus unconstrained (co)products. This difference
speaks to the potential power of category theory in that it affords a
finer grained analysis within the major levels defined by
(co)product arity (i.e., unary, binary, ternary, etc). Although
further work is needed to ascertain the empirical implications of
these differences both within and across higher levels, the
examples provided show how this work may proceed.
There are two main types of predictions for these extended
paradigms that follow naturally from the arities of computed
(co)oroducts. They are: (1) tasks involving (co)products of arity n
will yield significantly lower performance than tasks involving
(co)products are arity mvn for participants within the same age
group, excluding of course floor effects, where performance on
neither task is above chance; and (2) tasks at the same arity will
yield significance performance correlations. A corollary to these
predictions is that older participants will generally outperform
younger participants on a task at a given arity.
One may wonder whether other category theory-based models
could account for the same developmental data. Set has been the
categorical basis for our analysis. A natural alternative for modeling
relations is the category Rel, which has sets, A,B,..., for objects;
and for morphisms from A to B, relations R(A|B, instead of
functions, wheretheidentity morphismon A istheequality relation,
f(a,a)ja[Ag; and composition defined so that for R : A?B and
S : B?C, S0R~f(a,c)jAb[B : (a,b)[R ^ (b,c)[Sg. Composition
in this category is essentially an equijoin. Thus, Transitive Inference
on a set A is represented more succinctly by a diagram consisting of
a morphism, R : A?A and its composition with itself, R0R, being
the inference. However, Class Inclusion does not lend itself to a
moresuccinct representationinRel, so the analogy between the two
cannot be captured in Rel. (The inclusion relations A5C and
B5C capture the data for Class Inclusion, but there is no valid
composition operation in this context.) This example reinforces our
earlier point that category theory, while abstract, is not an arbitrary
fit-for-all formulation.
These two categorical bases for Transitive Inference (Set and
Rel) raise another point in regard to a notion of cognitive flexibility
mentioned earlier. The Set version of Transitive Inference
indicates that to make the inference one must consider the
constraining item c (in Diagram 14) from two perspectives
conjointly: in the case of the blocks task, as the block that is both
higher than b and lower than d. By contrast, in the Rel version,
the inference relies on just one morphism or perspective, applied
twice. This difference also has implications for developmental and
comparative psychology in that simply demonstrating transitivity
in infants and non-humans is not sufficient evidence of a cognitive
capacity that is in some way equivalent to older children and adult
humans. Our categorical (co)product formulation says that if they
have the capacity for Transitive Inference in the same cognitively
flexible manner, then they should also have the capacity for other
inferences involving (co)products such as Class Inclusion, assuming
a means of administering the test that is appropriate for the cohort.
Category theory affords a view of the forest despite the trees. It
helps reveal unseen connections between (cognitive) structures.
And, in doing so, the methods and results from one field become
applicable to another. That was the original motivation for having
a science of cognition.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Duality
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000599.s001 (0.09 MB PDF)
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